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CULTURAL IDENTITY AND
BEHAVIORAL CHANGE
Edmund W. Gordont
If one were to advance as the ultimate standard of morality
the prohibition of inhumane and exploitative behavior, one would,
no doubt, outlaw war, poverty, capitalism, female and male circum-
cision, and capital punishment, as well as both geographic and
economic colonialism. However, the problems with universal prohi-
bitions involve definition and compliance. As horrible as many of
us in the West might consider the practices and consequences of
these several candidates for prohibition, gaining consensus around
their definition as inhumane and exploitative would be difficult if
not impossible. Extending such consensus worldwide would be
even less likely. Without such universal consensus coupled with
economic, educational, and social intervention, the expectation of
worldwide compliance would be unreasonable. Professor Obiora
aptly quotes Nakajima on this point.' Obviously human behavior
may be constrained, even coerced, by laws, but it tends to proceed
on the basis of beliefs and custom. Obiora argues that efforts at
controlling and changing current practices of female circumcision
must go beyond moralistic condemnation and legal prohibition, if
the humane ends behind some of these efforts at control are to be
achieved.
Obiora wisely recognizes that the various forms of female
circumcision are deeply grounded in cultural identity and cultural
practice, and that this groundedness must inform any effort at
controlling or preventing the practice.2 In the light of these in-
" John M. Musser Professor of Psychology, Emeritus, Yale University and Visiting
Scholar, The College Board.
1. L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence
in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 122 (1996).
2. See Obiora, supra note 2, at 28-34, 115-42.
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sights her program of intervention is a rational one, but is at most
ameliorative. Of possibly greater significance is the fact that her
interventions, perhaps appropriately, do not fully respect the argu-
ment with which she begins the paper. If we are to fully honor the
integrity of cultural diversity and cultural identity, who has the
right to change their modes of expression? If these cultural forms
are to be modified, who defines the nature of the education and
clinicalization by which they are changed? Obiora chooses to privi-
lege a standard appropriate to modem, technologically advanced
cultures. I think I agree with her. Her conclusions and suggestions
for intervention are culturally comfortable for me, but they are
epistemologically irritating because her solutions are insufficiently
accommodative of extant cultural variations.
Every culture seems to legitimize its own conveniences as
well as its own sins, stupidities, and transgressions. With increasing
cultural, economic, and political globalization, inconsistencies and
contradictions between factors that are to be universally legitimized
become highlighted. In practice, the achievement of some universal
standards thus becomes a question of who has the power of speci-
fication. Why is female circumcision more heinous a crime than is
capital punishment, capitalist exploitation, or the waging of aggres-
sive war, except for the fact that the latter three practices are legit-
imized by the technologically and economically dominant societies
of the world? Why do we not mount social initiatives to prohibit
war, to make illegal government sanctioned murder, and to elimi-
nate the privilege of profit making over the serving of human
need?
At the core are questions related to the intersections between
culture, human behavior, and the structures of social control and
domination. We recognize culture as a pervasive and ubiquitous
cause and product of human behavior. The origins of complex
human behavior are rooted in cultural experience. Yet the cultures
that produce human behavior are themselves the products of human
activity. In the course of the production of culture, particular cul-
tural forms achieve hegemony within specific communities and
across communities that share similar spacial, temporal, and valua-
tive existences. What enables the achievement of hegemony is the
power to control and dominate distributions of power, resources,
and status. It is this power to determine cultural currency that also
influences behavioral maintenance and behavioral change. It is for
these and other reasons that Obiora asserts the critical role played
[Vol. 47:389
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by cultural practice and cultural identity in the persistence and
change of a cultural form like female circumcision.3
Psychologists and anthropologists such as Cole, Gay, Glick,
and Sharp, have concluded that regardless of cultural, ethnic, gen-
der, or class differences among human groups, there are no corre-
sponding differences in cognitive and affective processes.4 Rather,
it is held that the basic processes of mentation in the human spe-
cies (such as association, recall, perception, inference, and compari-
son) are common. It is the prior experiences, situations, and mean-
ings that form the context for the development and expression of
these processes. Because experiences, situations, and meanings are
culturally determined, the quality of the development of a process,
the conditions under which it is expressed,5 and even our ability to
recognize its manifestations is dependent upon cultural phenomena
that are often mediated through ethnic, gender, or class identity.
Obiora's discussion of the cultural importance of female cir-
cumcision provides an example of the importance of discussing the
culturally embedded nature of human experience and its meanings.
We have tended to frame our conceptions of being placed at-risk,
or of vulnerability to risk factors or abuse, within values derived
from the hegemonic culture. Practices which are aberrant within
that frame are thought of as negative or traumatic. What we have
not accounted for in this conception of at-risk status is the fact that
many of the individuals who may experience the most severe
stressors do not report psychological or social dysfunction.6
Gordon, Rollock, and Miller have suggested that threats to the
integrity of behavioral development and adaptation may exist along
a continuum, with the degree of threat better defined by existential
meaning than by "reality" factors; the individual's reaction to the
threat may depend upon the actual perception or the connotation
that is permitted by the context in which the phenomenon is expe-
rienced.7 Obiora reminds us that despite the actual complications
3. See id. at 115-42.
4. See MICHAEL COLE ET AL., THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF LEARNING AND THINKING
(1971) (comparing the performance of American and Kpelle (Liberian) children on tests of
cognitive skills).
5. See id.
6. See Paul F. Biting et al., Philosophical and Conceptual Issues Related to Students
at Risk, in STUDEiNs AT RISK IN AT-RISK SCHOOLS 17, 27-30 (Hershot C. Waxman et
al. eds., 1992); Edmund W. Gordon and Lauren D. Song, Variations in the Experience of
Resilience, in EDUCATIONAL REsILIENCE IN NwR-CrrY AMEuCA 27 (Margaret Wang and
Edmund W. Gordon eds., 1994).
7. See Edmund W. Gordon et al., Coping With Communicentric Bias in Knowledge
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and problems sometimes associated with the worst practices of
female genital mutilation, the practice does serve cultural and social
purposes, and the avoidance of the practice is associated with nega-
tive consequences for the uncircumcised person and her family.'
Barbaric and irrational as the practice may appear in one cultural
frame, in another frame the practice meets criteria for rationality.
Culture is a construct with a wide variety of definitions and
conceptions. Some authors have sought to distinguish between
material and non-material aspects of culture. Belief systems, atti-
tudes, and attributions are examples of non-material culture, while
tools, skills, and artifacts serve as examples of material culture. We
hold however, that at its core, culture is responsible for all human
behavior. That is, when we speak of culture, we are speaking of
both the cause and the product of human affect and cognition.
Geertz and Tyler are among those who have provided us with
widely accepted indices and definitions for culture.9 In his percep-
tion of culture, Tyler included knowledge, beliefs, art, law, custom,
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member
of society, ° while Geertz viewed culture as an "historically trans-
mitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols.., by means of
which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge
about and attitudes toward life."'" We see, then, an effort to dis-
cuss culture in terms of objects or tools as well as language and
shared conceptual schemata. In joining these perceptions of culture,
we can derive five fundamental dimensions of the construct:
(1) The judgmental or normative dimension is a reflection
of society's standards and values, which often provides the
constraints within which thought is facilitated;
(2) The cognitive dimension consists of categories of men-
tation (such as social perceptions, conceptions, attribution,
and connotations) that are often expressed through lan-
guage;
Production in the Social Sciences, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Apr. 1990, at 14.
8. See Obiora, supra note 1, at 23-25, 131-32
9. See Clifford Geertz, Religions as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 87 (1973); RALPH W. TYLER, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CURRICULUM AND IN-
STRUCTION (1949).
10. See TYLER, supra note 9.
11. Geertz, supra note 9 at 89.
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(3) The affective dimension refers to the emotional struc-
ture of a social unit and its common feelings, sources of
motivation, and so on;
(4) The skill dimension relates to those special capabilities
the members of a culture develop in order to meet the
demands of their social and techno/economic environ-
ment;' 2 and,
(5) The technological dimension refers not only to different
or more highly developed technological practices, but, more
importantly, it refers to the impact of the different informa-
tion inherent in these practices on cognitive and affective
behaviors.
These dimensions serve to emphasize those characteristics by
which a culture may be identified or by which the culture of a
group may be characterized. It is in this descriptive definition of
culture that we begin to see the reference points for one's social or
group identity, as well as the experiences that provide a context for
one's conception of one's own (as well as others') patterns of
behavior.
The function of culture in human activity, however, does not
end with its role as a descriptive concept. In addition to providing
the referents for group identity, culture also provides the stimuli
and the consequences of human behavioral patterns. Thus, culture
also serves as an explanatory construct. As mentioned earlier, when
we discuss cultural information in terms of description, we are
articulating the status phenomenon of culture, and in general are
referring to the social identity of individuals,'3 the group to which
the individual belongs, as well as describing the effect of this
identity on an individual's access to resources. When we seek to
explain behavior, however, and discuss the influence of one's per-
sonal identity, the group to which one feels that one belongs or
with which one identifies, we begin to wonder how particular lan-
guage and belief systems, specific objects and tools, not to mention
12. See JOHN U. OGBU, MINORrrY EDUCATION AND CAsTE 201-12 (1978) (discussing
the relation of skill development to employment opportunities).
13. See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTI-
TY (1963) (describing the social dynamics of relationships in which a personal characteris-
tic perceived as a flaw is a significant factor).
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technological advances, influence or enable the behavior of individ-
uals who experience them. When we examine ways of thinking,
such as linear and sequential thought, the tendency to generate
abstractions, field dependence or independence in one's perceptions,
social connotations, or technical taxonomies, as well as allowable
metaphors, we become aware of culture as a vehicle for cognition.
Ultimately, culture provides the constraints within which affective
and cognitive manifestations of mentation are enabled.
Furthermore, culture serves as a mediator for learning in two
fundamental respects. According to Vygotsky's notions of cognitive
development, learning occurs within social interaction.14 That is, in
contrast to the Piagetian conception of self-constructed knowledge,
Vygotsky argued that the development of higher psychological
functions is rooted in children's primary social interactions. 5
Learning, under the cultural/historical theory of behavior, consists
of three fundamental activities: transmission of knowledge and
cognitive skills, cultivation of cognitive abilities, and the encour-
agement of these cognitive abilities. According to this conception,
knowledge in one's culture is socially transmitted by adults and
capable peers to children. The adult or capable peer, in joint activi-
ty, serves as a role model or expert tutor on a task that allows for
cognitive processes to be demonstrated and then practiced and
learned. New cognitive abilities emerge as the adult works with the
child on tasks that may have originally been too demanding for the
child. As the pair work in collaboration, with the adult providing
encouragement as well as appropriate feedback, the child gradually
begins to take on the responsibility of the task. While initiating the
activity within the child's "zone of proximal development," with
time, the adult begins to remove support as the child becomes
more competent at the task. 6 Crucial in this process are the
shared cultural experiences and identities of the adult and child. It
is in this form of social scaffolding that we see the mechanism for
growth and development in emergent affective and cognitive func-
tioning.
14. See L. S. VYGOTSKY, MIND IN SocIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER PsYcHo-
LOGICAL PROCESSES (Michael Cole et al. eds., 1978) (translating and organizing material
originally written in Russian between 1930 and 1939).
15. See id. at 79-91.
16. Id.
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We cannot overstate the importance of an individual's group
and personal identity in the social interaction that comprises the
learning process. A human characteristic, perhaps secondary only to
status and functional characteristics, is one's sense of self, mediated
by culture, which provides the fuel for the social interaction inher-
ent in learning behavior. It is not only through cultural encounters
that human cognition develops, but it is also through these same
social interactions that we begin to recognize our identity. Culture
provides the reference points that allow one to recognize oneself
not only in terms of gender, class, and ethnicity, but also to ac-
knowledge that one is separate from others. It is this complex
sense of self that one brings to the classroom, that must in turn be
met and integrated into the dynamic culture of the learning envi-
ronment in order for optimal development to occur. This interaction
between self and the learning environment is dialectical in nature.
Not only will the learning process enable one to grow and change
in fundamental ways, but one's development will clearly impact on
the culture of the learning environment.
We have discussed the impact of culture on what one does and
how one does it. Similarly, we have also addressed the manner in
which culture frames as well as enables one's feelings and thoughts
concerning what one does. The question arises, however, by what
mechanism does culture serve as the vehicle and context for human
activity? This question can be answered across several levels of
understanding; biological, psychological, and social. We will begin
at the biological, cellular level and work our way up to the arena
of social institutions.
Work in the field of cell assemblies and synaptogenesis pro-
vides new perspectives on the interrelationships between neural
activity, experience, and behavior. Specifically, Hebb has discussed
a model for understanding the relationship between brain function
and experience. 7 Neural cells differentiate, and, based on experi-
ence, associate with each other as "cell assemblies." While a single
cell may associate with several assemblies, under appropriate stimu-
lation, specific assemblies are activated." It is possible to argue,
then, that it is culture that provides the stimuli and the context
through which experience actively shapes the organization of brain
17. See D. 0. HEBB, THE ORGANIZATION OF BEHAVIOR: A NEUROPSYCHOLoGICAL
THEORY (1949).
18. See id. at 69-74.
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cells. Further, with respect to reinforcement, it is certainly culture
that serves to give meaning to the overt expressions of behavioral
products of these cell assemblies, meanings, and reinforcements,
which in turn allow the behavioral products to become established
patterns of behavior activity.
In addition to the association or differentiation patterns of cells,
the density of synaptic connections is also fundamentally deter-
mined by experiences during the late pre-natal and early post-natal
periods of development. 9 During the process of synaptogenesis,
synaptic connections are first over-produced, followed by a later
period of selective degeneration."° Greenough has theorized that
experience, in its role as activator of neural activity, is responsible
both for the organization of synapses, as well as for the selection
of which synapses will degenerate.2 '
Greenough further advanced a theory of experience-expectant
and experience-dependent processes to account for the relationship
between synaptic connections and experience.' Briefly, the experi-
ence-expectant theory hypothesizes that relevant or normal experi-
ence results in normal neural activity that in turn maintains typical
synaptic connections.'m Conversely, an absence of experience or
atypical experience may lead to irregular synaptic connections. In
Greenough's second theory, the experience-dependent hypothesis
states that specific neural activity, which results in the formation of
synapses, is the result of new information processing on the part of
the organism.24
It is clear, then, on the biological level, that a dynamic interac-
tion exists between the environment and human development. This
is also true for the interaction between social institutions and hu-
man behavioral patterns. Socio-cultural context is mediated through
institutional structures as well as personal interaction. This socio-
cultural context, in the form of family, religious institutions,
schools, and the like, provides the stimuli (for example values,
norms, skills, and technological devices) that form the organization
of cognitive and affective behavior in much the same way that
19. See William T. Greenough et aL, Experience and Brain Development, 38 CHID
DEV. 539, 541 (1987).
20. See id. at 543.
21. See id. at 539-43.
22. See id. at 540.
23. See id at 540-46.
24. See Greenough et al., supra note 19, at 540, 546-51.
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experience shapes synaptic connections. It should be understood,
however, that the relationship between culture and social institu-
tions is a reciprocal one. The relations between education and
culture serve to exemplify the dialectical nature of change. Our
educational system exists as a subset of our broader social context.
Over the course of time, our society has moved to embrace the
concept of education for all citizens. In turn, however, this educat-
ed citizenry is now capable of creating tremendous change within
our culture.
On the micro level, the experience of the socio-cultural context
is mediated through personal social interactions. It is here, in teach-
ing interactions that take the form of social scaffolding, that learn-
ers develop a system of knowledge structures and affective cogni-
tive skills that are congruent with the values, beliefs, and conven-
tions of their socio-cultural group. The interaction between learner
and significant other is premised on reciprocity. While it provides
the learner with the opportunity to develop personal attributions,
dispositions, and motivations to behave in essentially appropriate
ways, the growth of the learner creates new demands on the tutor.
Ultimately, it is the social institution that may come to replace,
or function in parallel with, the significant other, both as a source
of reinforcement and a vehicle for the normative dimensions of
culture. It is through the processes of assimilation, accommodation,
and adaptation of schemata that cultural transmission occurs. Sche-
matization then is the mechanism by which conceptual structures
come to represent cognitive, conative, and affective components of
phenomena experienced. In accommodation, then, the acquisition
and replication of stimulus/response/situation triads are related to
existing schemata, while, in adaptation, the existing schemata or
emerging conceptual frames are adapted to the demands of current-
ly perceived or changing conditions. Behavior change that occurs
outside of such accommodation and adaptation tends not to become
a stable and internalized part of the learner's repertoire.
Thus it is that Obiora challenges the polemics and intransigence
in the campaign against female circumcision. It is clear that she
finds the abuses and excesses associated with the practice as unac-
ceptable as do many of the most vocal opponents. However, her
well-reasoned position is both protective of the broader and long-
term interests of the females upon whom the custom is practiced
and respectful of the cultural/economic and social contexts in
which the practice is maintained.
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In this commentary I have sought to bring to the support of
her position some of the insights from the intersection between our
growing knowledge of culture, pedagogy, and psychology. What is
left unaddressed in the original paper and this commentary are
issues related to personal choice and the political economy of
female status. With respect to choice, there are the problems asso-
ciated with culturally and parentally imposed decisions. In too
many instances girls and women cannot be said to have free and
independent choice with respect to the practice of circumcision.
Rather the choice is imposed upon them by the pressure of custom
and/or parental preference. Free choice is further complicated by
the status of women and the political economies by which such
inferior status is imposed. So long as the control and abuse of
females and their bodies serve and/or complement the political and
economic arrangements of societies that practice female circumci-
sion, moralistic polemics and legalisms will contribute little to the
elimination of the practice.
